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ARTICLE
The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal
Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of
Armenia’s Europeanisation
LAURE DELCOUR* & KATARYNA WOLCZUK**
*Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, France;
**Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, The University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT The question of why some countries adopt external policy is particularly
salient with regard to Armenia. All indicators suggest that Armenia would be unlikely
to respond to EU stimuli for reform. And yet, in the early 2010s, Armenia vigorously
adopted EU policy and institutional templates. This article seeks to explain this
conundrum by exploring how EU policies (especially under the Eastern Partnership)
feed into the domestic context and meet the agenda of national elites. The article
deliberately departs from the mainstream explanations of ‘Europeanisation beyond
accession’ and argues that closer scrutiny of the domestic context is a sine qua non
for making sense of the baffling discrepancies in neighbouring states’ responses to EU
policies. The case of Armenia vividly demonstrates the imperative for re-assessing the
approaches that have so far focused on EU-level factors and for bringing together EU
variables with a detailed analysis of the domestic and regional contexts.
KEY WORDS: European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Europeanisation,
domestic change, elites’ strategies, Armenia, Russia
1. Introduction
The question of why some countries adopt external policy templates has
long been of interest to academics. Because it encompasses and connects
multiple levels of governance, the European Union (EU) is a stimulating
field to study the interaction between external influences and domestic
factors. After the last waves of EU enlargement, attention shifted to cases
with regard to which membership of the EU is precluded and where the
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adoption of EU policy templates is voluntary and not linked to preparations
for membership. The challenge, therefore, is to understand the rationale
behind countries’ interest in and adoption of EU rules when accession is not
the end goal.
This article selects the case of Armenia to test the main explanations pro-
vided by the literature on Europeanisation beyond enlargement. Based
upon the variables identified in the literature (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2012;
Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009), EU
efforts at promoting domestic change would not be expected to be effective
in Armenia, as apparently confirmed by the country’s accession to the
Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. Yet, perplexingly, Armenia
had over the period of several years vigorously adopted EU policy and
institutional templates.
This article explains this conundrum by exploring how EU policies (espe-
cially under the Eastern Partnership) feed into the domestic and regional
contexts and meet the agenda of national elites. In doing so, we encounter
the limitations of the existing approaches to Europeanisation beyond
enlargement, which focus heavily on EU-level factors. As a result, the liter-
ature on non-accession Europeanisation has reduced the role of domestic
factors to mere intervening variables, which tend to be very broad (e.g.
(non-)democratic regimes and dependency). This is because scholars have
primarily (even though not exclusively) focused on the conditions under
which the EU successfully exports its regulatory and institutional templates,
leaving aside the conditions under which third countries decide to adopt
them.
Therefore, we argue that together with an examination of EU mecha-
nisms, closer scrutiny of the domestic context is a sine qua non for making
sense of the baffling discrepancies in neighbouring states’ responses to EU
policies. We demonstrate with the case of Armenia that it is an interaction
between EU, domestic and regional factors which explains both the
country’s receptivity to EU templates in 2010–2013 as well as Armenia’s
decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union.
We argue that the Armenian leadership decided to adopt EU rules and
templates after a cost–benefit analysis of the EU’s offer against the coun-
try’s specific regional, political and economic context. We identify three
interwoven factors that explain Armenian authorities’ choice to align with
EU policies: first, a stronger domestic demand for reform templates; sec-
ond, the perceived legitimacy of the EU’s offer and, third, the perceived
compatibility of EU templates for reforms with Armenia’s security reliance
on the Russian Federation. We argue that these factors cannot be analysed
in isolation as the EU’s stronger engagement in Armenia coincided with
domestic demand against the (temporary) lack of counter-conditionality
from Russia.
The article consists of four parts. In the first section, we apply to
Armenia the variables identified in the literature purporting to explain
the EU’s influence on domestic change in the eastern neighbourhood. We
deduce that theoretically speaking Armenia should not be responsive to the
EU’s attempts to transfer its norms, rules and policies. We demonstrate in
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the second section that, on the contrary, Armenia is actually receptive to
EU influences and shows that it has used the acquis as a template for mod-
ernisation, albeit unevenly. We then interrogate the incongruence between
theory and empirical observations by drawing attention to key explanatory
factors, i.e. Armenia’s authorities growing sense of urgency with regard to
reforms, their positive assessment of the EU’s offer for modernisation under
the Eastern Partnership and the perceived complementarity of EU templates
for reform with the country’s security alliances. Finally, we conclude by
drawing theoretical insights from the empirical findings.
2. Current Research on Europeanisation Beyond Enlargement: External
Stimuli, Domestic Factors and Policy Change Applied to Armenia
The question of whether the EU can successfully transfer its policies and
templates outside the context of enlargement has attracted considerable
scholarly attention. According to the external governance approach—a
major analytical perspective on non-accession Europeanisation—the effec-
tiveness of rule transfer (or lack thereof) is primarily explained by existing
EU institutions, which ‘provide the template for the externalisation of EU
policies, rules and modes of governance’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig
2009, 802). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig find this explanation more ger-
mane than the two other accounts they identify as alternatives, i.e. the
domestic structure explanation (which refers to the compatibility of EU
rules with partner countries’ traditions, institutions and practices) and the
power-based explanations (which refers to the interdependence of partner
countries with alternative governance providers).
Yet, according to all three accounts identified above, we find that
Armenia should not be responding to EU demands for reform. In this sec-
tion, we apply specific variables identified in the literature to the case of
Armenia. In the rich literature on the EU’s influence in its eastern neighbour-
hood, Armenia is one of the least studied countries, yet it is often perceived
as a laggard in the implementation of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership
for three reasons. First, Armenia eschews membership aspirations, in sharp
contrast to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Second, the political regime
(a non-competitive political system dominated by oligarchic groups) would
probably not survive the reforms which Armenia would be required to intro-
duce. Finally, the lack of a strong dependency vis-a`-vis the EU (and a strong
security dependency vis-a`-vis other players, as reflected by the strategic
alliance with Russia and the membership in Russia-driven Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)) seemingly relegates the EU to a lower
level of importance for the Armenian leadership.
From the outset of the neighbourhood policy, a number of publications
have emphasised the lack of incentives (especially a membership perspec-
tive) offered by the EU as a major obstacle to the transfer of EU rules and
policy beyond its borders. For Kelley (2006), the lack of a strong reward
under the ENP explains the policy’s limited effectiveness. In the absence of
any membership perspective, the EU’s leverage is too weak to induce com-
pliance with EU acquis. However, more recently, scholars have challenged
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this assumption, developing a more nuanced understanding of the relation-
ship between a country’s intention to join the EU and its actual compliance
with EU demands. After studying Ukraine, Langbein and Wolczuk (2012)
demonstrated that membership aspirations do not shape the outcome with
respect to the adoption and application of EU rules. Yet they also show
that the selection of EU rules, which they define as ‘the undertaking of a
commitment to adopt and implement EU rules in official relations’ is
mainly driven by membership aspirations. Applied to Armenia, this sug-
gests that the country is unlikely to select EU templates, given that it has
never expressed any membership aspirations.
The nature of the political regime also seems to preclude Armenia’s
Europeanisation. For Franke et al. (2010, 155), the persistent Soviet-era
mentality of an incumbent regime in an ENP partner country may increase
adaptation costs linked to EU demands and result in considerable resistance
to EU policies. Bo¨rzel and Risse (2012) also identify the type of regime
(degree of democracy) as an important factor influencing domestic change
in response to the promotion of EU norms and policies: the more
authoritarian a regime is, the less likely is the EU to influence domestic
institutional change. This seems to apply to Armenia. While the country
was unprepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the challenges
stemming from independence, the conflict with Azerbaijan in the 1990s
‘thwarted early attempts at building democratic institutions and bolstering
political reform’ (Giragosian 2013, 12). As a result, unlike Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova, where democratisation (even if partial) has
occurred, Armenia hardly progressed in this regard. As pointed by
Iskandaryan (2012), post-Soviet Armenia has a record of rigged elections
and corrupt administration. The country is characterised by competitive
authoritarianism, where ‘formal democratic institutions are widely viewed
as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority’, yet
‘where incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, how-
ever, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for
democracy’ (Way and Levitsky 2002, 52). The tight overlap between politi-
cal and economic interests is another characteristic of the regime, resulting
in depleted public trust in political elites. Against this backdrop, the politi-
cal costs of adapting to EU demands would be expected to be higher in
Armenia than in some other neighbouring countries. More particularly, EU
requirements related to human rights, the rule of law and good governance
are unattractive to the incumbent authorities.
Regional patterns of dependencies are another set of variables influencing
the effectiveness of EU policies in the eastern neighbourhood. Power asym-
metries (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2012) are postulated as an important scope con-
dition for domestic institutional change. According to the power-based
explanation, the effectiveness of EU external governance varies depending
on EU resources vis-a`-vis and interdependence with partner countries
against the role of alternative poles of governance (Lavenex and
Schimmelfennig 2009, 792). Yet again, interdependence with the EU and
actual linkages with Armenia are limited especially as compared to Ukraine
or Moldova. For example, the number of Schengen visas requested by
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Armenian citizens is low when compared to Moldova and even Georgia.1
Trade interdependence is also weak, with low volumes of export from
Armenia to the EU and even lower volumes of EU imports to Armenia.2
Armenia does not even use its existing export quota under the enhanced
General System of Preferences (GSP+). The literature suggests that such a
low degree of interdependence weakens the EU’s leverage on Armenia. In
addition, scholars argue that in order for the EU to use hierarchical gover-
nance (considered the most effective mode of external governance), partner
countries have to be not only heavily dependent on the EU but also more
dependent on the EU than other sources of governance (Dimitrova and
Dragneva 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 804). Armenia’s over-
whelming dependence on Russia is therefore noteworthy. This pro-Russian
orientation manifests itself in two key respects: security and dependency in
key economic sectors. First, Armenia relies on Russia as a primary security
guarantor. Reliance on Russian military capabilities and participation
in Russia-led multilateral organisations strengthens Armenia vis-a`-vis
Azerbaijan and probably deters attacks. Second, it terms of economic links,
Russia is the most important source of investment and a destination for
labour migration. It is also a key supplier of energy to Armenia and has a
monopoly over gas distribution. In sum, Armenia’s (inter)dependence with
Russia is broad and deep. Since interdependence with Russia is ‘a key vari-
able defining the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance’ (Dimitrova
and Dragneva 2009, 854), Armenia would appear to be a clear-cut case for
eschewing Europeanisation.
3. An Unexpected Acceptance of EU Policy Templates: Empirical Evidence
from Armenia
Armenia has few incentives to adopt EU rules and templates, and the
decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union only seems to confirm the
validity of the explanations put forward in the literature. Yet, closer empir-
ical scrutiny indicates that, contrary to the aforementioned expectations,
Armenia was actually surprisingly receptive to EU influences and willing to
adopt EU standards: between 2010 and 2013, the country implemented
substantial reforms to comply with EU rules and continues to express an
interest in doing so.3
Such progress remains overlooked in the literature, with a few excep-
tions. Babayan and Shapovalova (2011) stress the positive attitudes
towards the Eastern Partnership in Armenia. Ademmer and Bo¨rzel (2013)
provide a comparative analysis of convergence in energy, anti-corruption
and migration policies, noting some considerable progress. They show that
while the high conditionality exerted by international actors yielded only
formal changes in anticorruption policies, Armenia partially complied with
the EU demands on energy and meets the EU’s detailed requirements on
migration.
Our own empirical research offers evidence from four sectors. The
research involves a multi-sector study of the impact of the EU on domestic
change, focusing on sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), regulation
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of state aid, visa liberalisation and reform of the gas market.4 Evidence of
significant approximation with EU rules was observed in three of four sec-
tors: SPS, competition and migration; energy was the exception.5 In sectors
where changes have been identified, they are of a relatively recent origin,
initiated around 2010. The three sectors where Armenia complies with EU
demands are representative because two of them (food safety and state aid)
pertain to the dense trade-related acquis and they were part of the EU’s
conditionality—known as ‘key recommendations’ before launching negoti-
ations of Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area (DCFTA). The third
sector (migration and visa-related rules) is pivotal in the light of the EU’s
offer to liberalise the visa regime with its eastern neighbours; at the same
time, it goes to the core of partner countries’ sovereignty, e.g. access to
their territory and rules related to citizenship.
The food safety area illustrates particularly well Armenia’s adoption of
EU templates. Despite only recent efforts to converge with EU food safety
requirements, Armenia made substantial progress. A major step in meeting
EU requirements to open DCFTA negotiations was the governmental
decree establishing a State Service for Food Safety in December 2010,
replacing previous bodies and creating a united authority as required by
the EU. Soon after, a risk assessment centre and a network of specialised
laboratories were set up (Joint communication by the European
Commission 2012). The establishment of the State Service for Food Safety
kicked off reforms in the area. An intergovernmental working group, com-
prised of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary experts, was established
to ensure further approximation of national legislation with EU require-
ments (Governmental Decree No 711 of 26 July 2011). A series of laws, as
well as numerous subordinate normative acts, was adopted on food
hygiene, fishery products, technical rules on food additives, hazard analyses
of foodstuffs, veterinary drugs and phytosanitary registration. This places
the country ahead of Ukraine which has neither adopted a Food Safety
Law nor created a Food Safety agency. Although closer empirical scrutiny
would be required to ascertain the degree to which EU rules are effectively
implemented, the introduction of EU food safety standards in Armenian
food-producing companies indicates that the country has started applying
EU templates.
Legal approximation on migration issues confirms this picture. Armenia
started negotiations for a visa facilitation and readmission agreement with
the EU only in 2012. Yet the country has reformed in line with EU stan-
dards in the area of migration. In 2009, the State Migration Agency was
upgraded to a State Service status with policy-making and coordination
competences, as recommended by the EU.6 This places the country ahead
of neighbouring Georgia which, despite being further ahead in the visa lib-
eralisation process, has not yet established a Migration Service (Delcour
2013). In line with EU recommendations, Armenia adopted a migration
management concept establishing an intergovernmental working group in
2010. The national action plan on migration drafted with the help of EU
advisors and approved in November 2011 includes performance indicators
and benchmarks. The signing of the visa facilitation (December 2012) and
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readmission agreements (April 2013) reflects Armenia’s progress towards
EU migration rules, even though an examination of the implementation of
these agreements would be needed to clarify the extent of application in
the area of migration.
With regard to regulation of state aid, as part of key recommendations
for opening negotiations on the DCFTA, Armenia was required to develop
a strategy and draft legislation on monitoring state aid. In line with the EU
recommendations, the State Commission for the Protection of Economic
Competition became the key body to oversee regulation of state aid.
The EU funded a twinning project on ‘Competition and State Aid’ over
2011–2012, located within the State Commission, which provided
significant support to Armenia in terms of legal approximation. With regu-
lation of competition state aid being a highly sensitive area due to its
restrictions on sovereign tax and industrial policies, Armenia has showed a
considerable degree of openness to the EU, including the presence of EU’s
long-term experts inside the State Commission. Even though the process
of approximation was cut short by the decision to join the Customs
Union, staff of the Commission expressed a great interest in continuous
cooperation with the EU.7
It is important to stress that such rapid reforms at the sectoral level can-
not be attributed to influence of other external actors, even though they
have been present in Armenia for a long time. Both domestic and EU actors
specifically attribute the domestic changes initiated since 2010 in Armenia
to EU’s engagement, and rapid results were visible in a number of sectors
with specific reference to the EU’s conditions, templates and assistance.
Armenia’s substantial achievements in terms of legal approximation and
institution building resulted in a rapid conclusion of DCFTA negotiations.
The DCFTA section of the association agreement encompasses tariff and
non-tariff barriers. Partner countries are expected to incorporate the bulk
of EU’s corpus of rules. DCFTAs thus entail wholesale institutional and
regulatory reform in key sectors of EU internal market and trade policy
(e.g. food safety, competition and intellectual property rights). Prior to
opening DCFTA negotiations, the EU issued ‘key recommendations’, which
required Armenia to adopt specific EU rules in key sectors, such as food
safety standards, competition and state aid, intellectual property rights and
so forth. In order to open the negotiations, Armenia adopted a ‘Strategy
for accelerating the reforms in the Republic of Armenia within the frame-
work of the Eastern Partnership’ (2011), introduced the changes and was
able to commence the DCFTA negotiations early March 2012. According
to EU officials, it was an ‘easy country’ to negotiate with, in contrast to
Ukraine or Georgia;8 and EU-Armenia negotiations were completed in July
2013.
Therefore, evidence shows that Armenia has been actively engaged with
EU policy and institutional templates, although implementation is uneven,
recent and in some sectors may prove to be short-lived owing to the coun-
try’s decision to join the Customs Union. It is thus clear that an in-depth
analysis is needed to understand this unexpected, even if circumscribed,
receptivity, to EU templates.
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4. Explaining the Interlocking Dynamics Behind Armenia’s Silent
Europeanisation
In this remaining part of the article, we explain the incongruence between
theoretical accounts and empirical evidence of compliance with EU
demands in Armenia. We postulate that only through an understanding of
the domestic agenda is it possible to discern the key factors driving the
adoption of EU policy and institutional templates by a non-member state.
Our overarching premise is that Armenia’s compliance derives from the
country authorities’ (cost–benefit) analysis of the EU’s offer in the light of
the challenges presented by the country’s specific context, i.e. a noticeable
deterioration in its political, economic and geopolitical situation. Armenia’s
interest coincided with the EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partner-
ship, an initiative which addressed the elites’ needs while entailing few
political costs for them. This choice was underpinned by the perceived
compatibility of adopting EU’s templates with its security alliance with
Russia.
4.1. Modernise to Survive
After 2008, ‘modernisation’ was prioritised as a survival strategy for an
increasingly vulnerable Armenia and its incumbent authorities. The deci-
sion to reform derives from economic and geopolitical crises that have
weakened the country’s position, and from lingering political tensions that
have developed since 2008.
In spite of the early introduction of structural reforms after the USSR
collapse, followed by a successful macro-economic stabilisation programme
in the mid-1990s, Armenia struggles with widespread poverty, high unem-
ployment and rising inequalities (BTI Armenia Country Report 2012). The
economic crisis of 2009 exposed the fragility of Armenia’s economic model9
with its heavy reliance on, first, remittances from labour migrants and its
diaspora, and second, the service sector and construction industry (BTI
Armenia Country Report 2012). The scale of the contraction of the Armenian
economy shocked the leadership. Remittances, an important part of the GDP,
have become an increasingly unreliable source of income and support.10
The deterioration of the regional environment only added to Armenia’s
economic woes. In particular, Armenia’s regional isolation resulting from
the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has been a defining fea-
ture of its post-Soviet existence. Its isolation (owing to the closed borders
with Turkey and Azerbaijan) also hinders trade and lowers its economic
growth by up to 30% of GDP. The 2008 conflict in Georgia (a major gate-
way to the world for Armenia) and the failed rapprochement with Turkey
a few months later further exacerbated its vulnerabilities. In this context
the Armenian authorities had little choice but to embark on domestic
reforms.
This emerged as a crucial issue for the authorities who faced a profound
internal political crisis. The 2008 presidential elections, from which
Sargsyan emerged as a nominal winner, were marred by post-electoral
violence. This violence resulted in casualties and a deadlock between the
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authorities and the opposition, in which neither side emerged as a clear
winner (BTI Armenia Country Report 2012, 2). While the authorities
became deeply unpopular, the opposition lacked clear policy alternatives.
The political deadlock left the Armenian authorities deprived of legitimacy
and was viewed with suspicion by a deeply polarised population. As a
result, a consensus emerged on the urge to reform further.
Overall, pressures for reforms increased so much that by 2010, the
Armenia government became intent on carrying out reforms. The need for
domestic change became important to the political elites both to overcome
the country’s geopolitical and economic vulnerability and to ensure their
political survival.
4.2. The EU as a Key Partner in the Modernisation Process: A Cost–
benefit Analysis
The EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership was therefore
serendipitous and highly relevant to the country’s needs, while at the same
time not threatening the political survival of the elites through democratic
conditionality.
4.2.1. The Eastern Partnership — a timely template for Armenian
reforms. While in the 1990s, the EU was uninterested in the South Cauca-
sus, the launch of the ENP and, especially, the Eastern Partnership heralded
a new beginning. In particular, following the Rose revolution in Georgia
and increasing pressure by some EU actors, South Caucasus countries were
formally included in the ENP in 2004. The policy became fully operational
only in 2007 after the ENP action plans were signed. Nonetheless, the EU
remained a distant actor, owing to the lack of EU Delegation in Armenia
until 2008.11 Overall, the ENP—with its vague and remote prospect of a
‘stake in the Internal Market’ (European Commission 2003, 4)—failed to
offer tangible incentives for Armenia to reform in absence of domestic
demand.
In contrast, the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009 proved a particu-
larly attractive offer, coinciding with the country’s needs, as it provided
new and tangible prospects: an enhanced contractual framework (associa-
tion agreements combined with DCFTAs), the prospect of visa liberalisa-
tion and increased sectoral cooperation. Even though the EU’s eastern
policy largely eschews security issues that have been pivotal for Armenia, it
offered an unprecedented scale and intensity of linkages. The Eastern Part-
nership established direct links between sectoral reforms and an enhanced
relationship with partner countries. From the EU perspective, a closer rela-
tionship with neighbouring countries depended on their convergence with
EU’s technical rules and political norms. Regulatory approximation was
expected to ‘contribute to the modernisation of the economies of the
partner countries and anchor the necessary economic reforms’ (European
Commission 2008, 3)—an objective which meets Armenian authorities’
own modernisation agenda.
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The Eastern Partnership introduced highly targeted conditionality at a
sectoral level. As DCFTAs include binding provisions on the application of
trade and regulatory frameworks, the EU used conditionality to ensure that
key elements were effectively implemented before negotiations were opened
(Delcour and Wolczuk 2013). Therefore, the launch of the EaP was crucial
in terms of linking greater proximity to the EU with reforms in a few spe-
cific sectors, such as food safety, migration and state aid. Together with
explicit sector-specific conditionality, the Eastern Partnership intensified
interactions at a technical, expert level. Such interactions with the Cauca-
sus countries had been underdeveloped within the ENP.12 Until 2008, in
Armenia ‘there was very little understanding as to what the ENP was actu-
ally about’, according to an EU official based in Yerevan.13 Being much
more focused on the specificities of policy transfer, therefore, the Eastern
Partnership fostered a better understanding within Armenia as to what was
required of the country in order to ‘move closer’ to the EU. The increased
technical assistance and intensification of governance networks greatly
facilitated the exposure of Armenia to EU governance templates. Under the
various Eastern Partnership bilateral and multilateral formats, Armenian
high-level officials, experts and civil society organisations have been repeat-
edly exposed to EU rules, norms and practices.
Since the Eastern Partnership was launched, there has been a consensus
amongst domestic actors on the benefits of closer relations with the EU.
Instead of being a distant external actor, the EU came to be seen as the
major partner in the modernisation process, as reflected in President
Sargsyan’s speech in Marseille in December 2011:
The European Union has not only become one of our most important
partners in the world but also plays a significant role inside Armenia,
assisting us in the implementation of the reforms and in strengthening
economic and overall stability of the country.14
The discourse held by Armenian leaders and officials was highly positive
for two key reasons. First, the absence of a membership perspective under
the Eastern Partnership, which has been strongly criticised by some other
eastern neighbours, such as Ukraine, was not considered a drawback in
Armenia as the country had not declared membership aspirations. Second,
EU governance templates were viewed as highly timely for Armenia. In par-
ticular, there was no incongruence between pre-existing reforms and EU
templates—a factor that explains Georgia’s resistance to compliance under
the Saakashvili presidency (Delcour 2013). So when the EU stepped up its
role as a ‘governance exporter’ in 2009, Armenia was strongly interested in
adopting external policy and institutional templates. The Eastern Partner-
ship came to be perceived as a timely stimulus for modernising the country,
much in line with the EU’s own vision of the policy. The EU’s role inside
Armenia, according to President Sargsyan’s speech in Marseille, was to
provide guidance for the country’s internal reform process.15
This is reflected in Armenia’s approach to convergence at the sectoral
level. Armenia has carefully estimated the costs of reforms to comply with
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EU demands, for instance in the food safety sector. This is particularly
noteworthy as it has not yet been done by all eastern partners, including
those ahead of Armenia.16 The considerable costs associated with SPS (e.g.
creation of laboratories and training of inspectors) have not deterred the
country from further reforms in line with EU requirements.17 Indeed,
Armenia has accepted the short-term costs for the sake of the long-term
benefits expected to accrue from the adoption of EU rules, as reflected in
the food safety sector and seeking access to the single market. At early
stages of reform, the Food Safety Agency and the Ministry of Agriculture
have consulted widely (including food industry and producers, consumer
associations) in order to identify products suitable for future exports to the
EU market.
Clearly, Armenia’s choice of the EU as a beacon was premised on the
belief that EU rules and policies would be conducive to modernisation and
benefit it, as reflected in the comments of Sargsyan at the Vilnius Eastern
Partnership summit:
The Eastern Partnership enabled us to give new impetus to the mod-
ernisation efforts to our state and society upon the principles of
democracy, human rights and rule of law. It stimulated the agenda of
our wide-scale reforms.18
4.2.2. The Eastern Partnership: modernising with minimal political costs. The
EU’s offer—focused on long-term, low-politics cooperation on technical
issues—was all the more attractive as it did not require (at least in the
beginning) political reforms that would entail high costs for the Armenian
elites, or even threaten their political survival.
Under the Eastern Partnership, especially, the EU has focused on sectoral
regulatory approximation, initially leaving aside polity-related changes, i.e.
democratisation and human rights as well as the rule of law. Upon the
launch of the Eastern Partnership, the EU adopted explicit conditionality
based on clear benchmarks only with regard to specific sectors identified as
priority areas under the forthcoming DCFTA negotiations, as well as nego-
tiations related to visa facilitation and/or liberalisation. True, it has been
argued that EU sectoral policies include strongly codified democratic gover-
nance provisions (Freyburg et al. 2009, 1033). Yet closer scrutiny of EU
conditions under key sectoral policies reveals that the EU has only occa-
sionally fostered the ‘incorporation of democratic principles into adminis-
trative rules and practices’ (Freyburg et al. 2009, 1028) at the sectoral
level. Rather, it has primarily sought to export those rules guaranteeing the
quality and safety of products to be traded under DCFTAs; likewise, under
the visa facilitation/liberalisation process, it has prioritised security-related
rules at the expenses of human right-related provisions (Trauner et al.
2013).
For Armenia, this means that when the Eastern Partnership was launched,
the EU accepted the non-democratic political status quo after the 2008 crisis
as a given without making explicit political changes a precondition for
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closer ties, not requiring a sharp separation of politics from the economy, as
advocated by civil society organisations (Chatham House 2011). Thus, pow-
erful economic actors present in Armenian politics could continue to
advance their business interests via political means unhindered.
Therefore, the modalities of EU’s policies vis-a`-vis Armenia facilitated
the country’s responsiveness to EU influences. The political costs of engage-
ment with the EU were low, while the elites could increase their legitimacy
by modernising the country, especially as regulatory convergence did not
entail immediate power costs in terms of loosening their control over the
political system. The elites dovetailed their domestic agenda with EU–
Armenia relations, even though civil society organisations and experts criti-
cised the EU’s lack of emphasis on democracy and human rights arguing
that it added legitimacy to the old political establishment, leading to disen-
chantment in society (Chatham House 2011). Despite their non-democratic
profile, Armenian authorities were de facto legitimised by the EU which
actively interacted with them under the negotiations for association
agreements and DCFTAs.
At the same time, Armenia’s strongly centralised political regime facili-
tated the adoption of EU templates with few veto players able to block
rapid reforms. The vertical exercise of power proved to be a driver for pol-
icy change where it coincided with the domestic agenda, as illustrated in
our study by the migration and food safety areas.
4.3. The Perceived Compatibility between EU Templates for Modernisation
and a Security Alliance with Russia
The defining feature of post-Soviet Armenia has been the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The protracted nature of the conflict and ongoing fears
of an attack by Azerbaijan elevated Nagorno-Karabakh to the paramount
foreign policy priority for Armenia, relying on Russia to provide its
security. However, the continued vulnerability of Armenia means that it
is constantly seeking other allies, even if in economic — rather than
security — terms. Thus, while the role of the EU as a security provider is
highly circumscribed,19 the country aimed to ‘enhance Armenia’s strategic
significance to the West while also elevating its value as Russia’s reliable
regional ally’ (Giragosian 2011, 3).
In contrast to the EU, Russia is not regarded as a credible source of policy
templates for modernisation.20 Hence, there was no incongruence between
dependence on Russia for security and economic reasons and the interest in
the EU, thereby enabling Armenia to seek integration with both, yet along
different lines. In essence, the ‘complementarity’ principle signified the
combined reliance on Russia to protect Armenia militarily with reliance on
the EU to promote the country’s economic development.21 However,
Russia has remained the key security guarantor and hence linkages with the
EU complement rather than replace the dependency on Russia. This depen-
dency accounted for Armenia’s restrained rhetoric vis-a`-vis the EU. As one
Armenian interviewee put it: ‘we are not in a position to yell: “EU!” because
of our security situation’.22 This makes Armenia an interesting case of ‘silent
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Europeanisation’, whereas most states seeking closer integration with the
EU, including Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, are only too keen to loudly
proclaim their pro-European aspirations.
Nevertheless, this compatibility owing to Russia’s lack of objection to
Armenia’s policy towards the EU proved relatively short-lived. While ini-
tially Russia did not constrain Armenia’s moves towards the EU, this
abruptly changed in 2013. Russia became concerned over growing EU
influence in the neighbourhood, especially as it launched its own project of
deep economic integration, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russia. The ECU was developed with a view to creating in
2015 an alternative to the EU, through the Eurasian Economic Union
(Dragneva and Wolczuk 2013). Although Armenia initially ruled out mem-
bership in the Eurasian project,23 Russia gradually forced Armenia to
reverse its decision. In April 2013, the country signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Eurasian Economic Commission, which was still
vague and lacked any binding obligations. Yet on 3 September 2013,
President Sargsyan suddenly announced his country’s intention to join the
ECU, stating that ‘participating in one military security structure [i.e.
CSTO] makes it unfeasible and inefficient to stay away from the relevant
geo-economic area’.24 The role of Russia in guaranteeing the country’s
security was key in Armenia’s decision on accession to the Russian-led
Single Economic Space. Russia’s use of security vulnerability (e.g. arms
sales to Azerbaijan) forced Armenia to reject EU’s offer of deep economic
integration even though negotiations had been completed a few weeks ear-
lier. The highly centralised decision-making system in Armenia helps
explain this volte-face. The decision to engage in Eurasian integration was
taken by the president without any domestic deliberations and took the
Armenian elites, society as well as the EU itself by surprise.
Armenia’s decision has taken the association agreement with a DCFTA
off the agendas. While it did not raise any significant protests in the coun-
try, this decision overshadows persistent tensions and doubts within parts
of Armenian society, primarily NGOs and business (Delcour 2014). Para-
doxically, Armenian officials continue to proclaim an interest in adopting
EU policy templates, suggesting that the first two factors behind Armenia’s
compliance are still valid. As indicated by President Sargsyan, ‘building
and strengthening Armenian nationhood upon a European model has been
a conscious choice of ours, and that process is hence irreversible. Our
major objective is to form such mechanisms with the EU that on the one
hand would reflect the deep nature of our social, political and economic
relationship, and on the other—would be compatible with other formats of
co-operation’.25
While Armenia’s openness to EU’s policy templates remains high, it has,
however, been severely constrained by participation in the Eurasian inte-
gration project. In practice, the programme of economic modernisation a` la
EU has been largely suspended by the Union, reflecting the fact that in the
EU’s view Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian project is not compatible
with the adoption of its own acquis. Whereas in migration there is a high
degree of complementarity (Ademmer and Bo¨rzel 2013), in other sectors
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Eurasian integration regime requires a high degree of harmonisation
with its own expanding regulatory frameworks. The EU is reluctant to
facilitate Armenia’s regulatory modernisation, even when it relates to
WTO commitments, when this facilitates membership in an alternative
regime for economic integration. It has thus significantly reduced the scope
of its assistance to Armenia.
Yet, as the ECU and its upgraded form—the Eurasian Economic Union
—are complex organisations, preparation for membership has been a cum-
bersome process. Even though formally major steps have been undertaken
with the adoption of a road map in December 2013 followed by the
approval of the action plan for implementation in January 2014 and the
signature of the accession treaty to the Eurasian Economic Union in
October 2014, the country has actually requested exemptions from cus-
toms duties on 900 commodity groups during accession talks. This huge
number reflects Armenian concerns about the economic consequences of
accession not only in terms of rising import customs duties but also the
need to reconsider Armenia’s WTO commitments (Delcour 2014).
5. Conclusions: The Case for Revising Existing Approaches to Non-
accession Europeanisation
According to the key explanations used in the literature, Armenia should
not be converging with EU norms, yet it has done so, rather rapidly. Strong
empirical evidence across policy sectors demonstrates the country’s recep-
tivity to EU influences, something that existing approaches seem unable to
explain.
In our view, this stems from both the predominant focus on EU-level
variables in the literature and their disconnection with other sets of
variables. EU sectoral conditionality and incentives under the Eastern
Partnership do matter to explain Armenia’s adoption of EU templates in
2010–2013. Yet they fail to explain why the country abruptly decided to
join another regional integration project at a time when it had met key EU
demands under the DCFTA and completed the negotiations. Despite the
‘pull’ for compliance triggered by the need for modernisation, the domestic
structure explanation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) alone does not
suffice to explain the conundrum of Armenia’s integration as it is a broad
and vague concept which subsumes domestic preferences, actors and shift-
ing dynamics. Finally, the power-based explanation taken in isolation can-
not explain why Armenia initially complied with EU demands.
What the single case of Armenia demonstrates is that the three sets of
factors taken separately and analysed as static and isolated variables fail to
explain empirical evidence on the country’s Europeanisation. On the con-
trary, we show that it is the temporal interlocking of EU, domestic and
regional factors which accounts both for the rapid compliance with EU
demands and the sudden decision not to pursue association with the EU.
We highlight three factors. The first is Armenian authorities’ growing
sense of urgency around modernisation, stemming from an increased regio-
nal vulnerability (in the wake of the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the failed
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rapprochement with Turkey and lingering political tensions in the
aftermath of the 2008 presidential elections). In this context, the EU’s
enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership provided an opportunity for
Armenian authorities to modernise the country with a view to loosening its
vulnerability while incurring few political costs for the ruling elite. The
EU’s path to modernisation was also regarded as compatible with (and
complementary to) Russian-centred regional security regimes. Nonetheless,
ultimately Russia’s pressure on Armenia (together with the lack of any
security guarantee by the EU) has swayed the country’s decision away from
concluding the Association Agreement and instead towards joining the
Russian-led Eurasian integration.
By providing empirical material on a little known case study, we enrich
our understanding of non-enlargement Europeanisation in cases where the
EU is not the only ‘diffusing power’. In our view, Armenia’s ‘silent Europe-
anisation’, i.e. adopting EU templates without a vocalised demand for
membership, demonstrates the need for a research design which allows for
stronger interactions between EU-related variables with domestic condi-
tions and regional linkages. This is not least because the nature of the EU’s
policies can only be assessed at a country level rather than ex ante: outside
the context of enlargement, what constitutes an ‘incentive’ is highly
country-specific as EU influences are filtered through shifting domestic pref-
erences, constraints and capacities. In other words, in the neighbourhood,
countries’ receptivity is determined by ‘importing’ countries rather than the
‘exporting’ organisation and this applies both to the eastern and southern
neighbourhoods of the EU.
Overall, our research has demonstrated that existing theories do not
accommodate realities ‘on the ground’ and signal the need for a new
research approach based on extensive empirical data. Theory building
about EU’s influence in non-member states needs to be premised on actual
systematic and comparative empirical research, even though data collection
in those countries is more challenging for a variety of reasons, not least
logistical and linguistic. By zooming out from EU-level variables and start-
ing with the domestic context, structures and agenda, scholars will be able
to identify a wider range of factors accounting for domestic change in the
eastern neighbourhood countries, or lack thereof, and to develop a more
robust research framework allowing for cross-country, cross-sector, but
also timely, comparisons in what is a rapidly changing part of the world.
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Notes
1. European Commission DG Home, Visa statistics for 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm).
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2. 39.4% of Armenian exports went to the EU in 2012 while 26.5% of imports came from the EU.
Source: DG Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113345.pdf
(accessed 6 July 2014).
3. Authors’ interviews with Armenian experts and state officials in Yerevan, February 2014.
4. Over 50 semi-structured interviews were conducted with national officials in charge of European
integration in Armenia (in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, line Ministries and state agencies and
committees), civil society and academic experts, and EU officials in Yerevan and Brussels.
5. Reform of energy market is one sector where Armenia has not been receptive to EU reform tem-
plates. These mainly relate to accession to the European Energy Community and the related com-
mitment to implement the so-called 2nd and 3rd energy packages. Given Armenia’s regional
isolation, energy-related acquis, is simply regarded as irrelevant to Armenia (Authors’ interview,
Yerevan, November 2011). Interestingly, energy was the only sector, where unsuitability and
irrelevance of the acquis was raised. However, in 2013 Armenia expressed an intention to the join
the European Energy Community, the membership of which entails the adoption of the 2nd and
3rd energy packages.
6. Authors’ interview State Migration Service, Yerevan, November 2011, and EU Progress Report
2013.
7. Authors’ interviews in the State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition,
Yerevan, February 2014.
8. Authors’ interviews with EU officials in Brussels in May and June 2013.
9. The GDP dropped by 14.04% and according to the Armenian State Statistical Service poverty
increased with 36% of all Armenians classified as living in poverty in 2009, up from 28% in 2008.
10. The bulk of remittances (89%), which have accounted for 16% of GDP over the past five years,
come from Armenians living and working in Russia (Ghazaryan and Tolosa 2012).
11. In the 1990s the EC opened only one delegation in Tbilisi for all three South Caucasus countries.
12. Authors’ interview with an EEAS official, Brussels, September 2011.
13. Authors’ interview in Yerevan, November 2011.
14. Number: President Sargsyan, speech before the plenary meeting of the 20th Congress of the Euro-
pean People’s Party, Marseille, 7 December 2011, accessed on 30 December 2011.
15. http://www.president.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2011/12/07/news-344/.
16. Authors’ interviews in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia (May 2012, April 2012 and November
2011, respectively).
17. Authors’ interview with an EU expert, Yerevan, November 2011.
18. President Sargsyan, Speech at the third Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 29 November 2013,
http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/11/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-at-
the-third-Eastern-Partnership-summit/.
19. This can be explained by both external and internal factors, such as a weak presence in the South
Caucasus in the 1990s and the lack of an adequate toolbox for conflict resolution, and the pres-
ence of a number of other players (Delcour and Duhot 2011).
20. This is evident even within the sector most dependent on Russia, i.e. the military. With regard to
military reforms, ‘Armenia remains reliant on Russian arms and discounted weapon stocks
through the CSTO, [but] in terms of operational training, doctrine and modernization, Armenia
defense reforms have adopted a firmly pro-Western perspective’ (Giragosian 2011, 3).
21. Richard Giragosian News.Am, Arminfo, 6 September 2013.
22. Authors’ interview with a civil society expert, Yerevan, November 2011.
23. Interview of Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan, Kommersant’, 4 April 2012, quoted in
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39,285&tx_ttnews[backPid]
=7&cHash=6ce28b454f1f1e57872b04dc640fb906.
24. President of the Republic of Armenia, http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/09/03/
President-Serzh-Sargsyan-working-visit-to-Russian-Federation/.
25. President Sargsyan, Speech at the third Eastern Partnership Summit, op.cit.
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